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An Investigation of Luther’s View of the 
Bondage of the Will with Implications for 
Soteriology and Theodicy 
 
John Peckham 





Martin Luther sparked one of the greatest movements of Christian 
history when he challenged tenets of the Catholic faith in 1517, and his 
influence is still very strong.1 One of Luther’s major contributions to 
theology was his emphasis on grace. This was extracted from the writ-
ings of Paul and also influenced by the works of the great church father 
Augustine. This paper endeavors to look at Luther’s view of the human 
will in the context of his soteriology of grace. Specifically, what is Lu-
ther’s conception of the freedom of the will? Does the human nature 
have any such thing as free will in its post-fall state? Moreover, how 
does Luther define the process of salvation? In other words, why are 
some saved and others lost? These and other questions must be addressed 
from Luther’s perspective. Luther lays out his views on the will of God 
and the will of man in a polemic against the viewpoints of Desiderius 
Erasmus in the book, The Bondage of the Will. Therein, Luther’s sote-
riology is made explicit. This paper will look at Luther’s theology and 
interact with it from a biblical perspective with the purpose of expositing 
Luther’s theology of the will. The coherence or incoherence of Luther’s 
theology of the human will is also of great importance to this study. The 
issue of the will also bears heavily on the ability to uphold the goodness 
                                                
1 Jaroslav Pelikan, Reformation of Church and Dogma (1300-1700), 5 vols., The 
Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine (Chicago: U of Chicago 
P, 1984), 4:139. 
PECKHAM: LUTHER’S VIEW OF THE BONDAGE OF THE WILL 
275 
and justice of God. How does Luther’s approach integrate with some 
biblical passages on the nature of God and the nature of salvation?  
Martin Luther’s famous struggle and arduous trial (Anfechtung) over 
his own salvation through works brought him to the conclusion that “by 
his own understanding or strength he could not believe in Jesus Christ or 
come to him.”2 Luther was “very troubled by the idea of iustitia Dei, the 
‘righteousness of God.’”3 He thought of God as a completely impartial 
judge, a dispassionate umpire. He states, “I did not love, yes, I hated the 
righteous God who punishes sinners . . .”4 Thus Luther became certain 
that he could not be saved.5 Accordingly, the promise of salvation was 
bitter, it was “as if God had promised a blind man a million dollars, pro-
vided that he could see.”6 Luther struggled long and arduously, but fi-
nally found light. He discovered that the righteousness of God is not His 
just condemnation of sinners but “the righteousness which is given to us 
so that we may meet that precondition.”7 Luther then spent a career 
preaching the grace of God. The primacy of grace thus became funda-
mental to his Christian belief. So when the issue of free will was raised, 
Luther saw it as a great threat to his doctrine of salvation. His position is 
laid out clearly in his dispute with Erasmus entitled The Bondage of the 
Will (De servo arbitrio). He always considered this a very important 
work, saying “‘none of my works is worth anything except’ the cate-
chism and De servo arbitrio.”8 
It is important to understand the context of this work before Luther’s 
arguments are examined. The opponent of Luther was a towering 
scholar.9 Erasmus originally was a supporter of Luther’s and had called 
for reforms himself. However, as things heated up, he felt that he needed 
to distance himself. By speaking out against predestination, Erasmus 
“would be able to separate himself from the reformer without rejecting 
                                                
2 Robert Kolb, Bound Choice, Election, and Wittenberg Theological Method: From 
Martin Luther to the Formula of Concord (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 11. 
3 Alister McGrath, Reformation Thought: An Introduction (New York: Blackwell, 
1988), 93. 
4 Martin Luther, Career of the Reformer IV, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald, 
and Helmut T. Lehmann, Luther’s Works (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1999), 34:336. 
5 McGrath, 93. 
6 Ibid., 94. 
7 Ibid., 100. 
8 Kolb, 15. 
9 “If any figure stands head and shoulders above other northern European humanists 
. . . it was Erasmus of Rotterdam” (McGrath, 53). Erasmus is also famous for his compi-
lation of the New Testament in the original Greek.  
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his own call for reform.”10 Luther, on the other hand, considered Eras-
mus to be merely a “moralist” or a proponent of “works-piety”11 and 
thought that “Erasmus had no notion of the nature of the gospel.”12 This 
made Luther less likely to consider Erasmus’ view on its merits. They 
also disagreed on the interpretation of Scripture. Gerhard O. Forde repre-
sents Erasmus’ method as a “box score” method, whereas Luther might 
rely on just “one passage” to convince of truth.13 Erasmus also held the 
view that Scripture should be interpreted carefully by trained scholars, 
whereas Luther thought the Bible should interpret itself and that every-
one should read it for themselves.14 Their concerns over the application 
of Scripture were likewise at odds. As will be seen shortly, their defini-
tion of the very meaning of terms was often very different, and thus they 
often “talked past each other.”15 The tone of the argument is often quite 
strong and argumentative. However, it must be understood that polemic 
was a commonly accepted style of writing, and thus the words of Luther 
may seem harsher to the contemporary reader than they really are.16 
Moreover, this was more than an academic dispute to Luther, it was a 
                                                
10 Kolb, 12. 
11 Harry J. McSorley, Luther: Right or Wrong?: An Ecumenical-Theological Study 
of Luther’s Major Work, the Bondage of the Will (New York: Newman, 1969), 287. 
12 Justo L. Gonzalez, A History of Christian Thought, 3 vols. (Nashville: Abingdon, 
1987), 3:56. For an interesting early 20th century analysis of Luther and Erasmus, see 
Robert H. Murray, Erasmus and Luther: Their Attitude to Toleration (London: Society 
for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1920). 
13 Gerhard O. Forde, The Captivation of the Will: Luther Vs. Erasmus on Freedom 
and Bondage (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 24. 
14 Kolb, 22. 
15 Kolb, 24. 
16 Ibid., 17. Gerrish refers to “Luther’s cheerful truculence and fondness for over-
statement [which] may have appeared to make predestination a bone of contention be-
tween Rome and Wittenberg” (Brian A. Gerrish, “Sovereign Grace: Is Reformed Theol-
ogy Obsolete?” Interpretation 57/1 [2003]: 55). McSorley states that at this time “an 
opponent was read not in order to understand him, but to refute him!” (McSorley, 287). 
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matter of Christian warfare.17 Based on this belief, “Luther was driven by 
his concern for terrified consciences.”18 
 
Luther’s Concept of Free Will 
Definition of Free Will. Martin Luther states the prime question of 
“whether God foresees anything contingently, or whether we do all 
things of necessity.”19 In his answer he defines “free will” by saying, “all 
who hear mention of ‘free-will’ take it to mean . . . a will that can and 
does do, God-ward, all that it pleases, restrained by no law and no com-
mand; for you would not call a slave, who acts at the beck of his lord, 
free.”20 Thus, for Luther, the term free will delineates a will that is able 
to do just about anything.21 Conversely, Erasmus defines his view by 
saying, “By free choice in this place we mean a power of the human will 
by which a man can apply himself to the things which lead to eternal 
salvation, or turn away from them.”22 This definition clearly allows 
power to the human will, especially in matters of salvation.23 These 
conflicting definitions continue to be problematic throughout the 
debate.24  
                                                
17 Kolb notes that “Luther was certain that their exchange was part of the final com-
bat between God and the devil. The warfare between God and Satan took place through-
out human history in the clash of God’s truth with the devil’s lies, and Luther sensed the 
end of history at hand, when only an intensification of the conflict could be expected” 
(Kolb, 18). For a study of Luther’s view of reason, philosophy, and scholasticism, see 
Brian A. Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther (Oxford: Claren-
don, 1962). 
18 Kolb, 23. 
19 Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, trans. O. R. Johnston (Grand Rapids: 
Baker, 2003), 79. 
20 Ibid., 137. 
21 This is an extreme definition of freedom of will that would be very difficult to de-
fend. In effect, one would have to be omnipotent to have free will, which is why Luther 
holds that only God has free will. However, this definition is not the one defended by 
advocates of free will, even though it is the one Luther argues against most often, as we 
will see. 
22 Desiderius Erasmus, “De Libero Arbitrio,” in Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and 
Salvation, ed. E. Gordon Rupp and Philip S. Watson (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969), 
47. 
23 However, it is not clear what the phrase “apply himself” entails. Luther found 
Erasmus’ view incoherent because it “leaves man effort and endeavour, but does not 
leave him anything that he may ascribe to his own strength” (Luther, The Bondage of the 
Will, 144). It is true that Erasmus’ view is historically viewed as inconsistent, and it need 
not be defended here. For an excellent discussion of Erasmus’ own struggle between 
contradictions during his debate with Luther, see James D. Tracy, “Two Erasmuses, Two 
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Another important distinction for understanding Luther’s position is 
his definition of contingency and necessity. First, Luther clarifies that 
“being done contingently does not, in Latin, signify that the thing done is 
itself contingent, but that it is done by a contingent and mutable will—
such as is not to be found in God.”25 On the other hand, Luther says that 
“necessity . . . cannot accurately be used of either man’s will or God’s.”26 
Luther does, however, speak of a “necessity of immutability.” He writes 
that the human will is not compelled: “I did not say ‘of compulsion’; I 
meant, by a necessity, not of compulsion, but of what they call immuta-
bility.”27 By this he means one acts “spontaneously and voluntarily. And 
this willingness or volition is something which he cannot in his own 
strength eliminate, restain or alter.”28 Thus, all that occurs, including the 
                                                                                                         
Luthers: Erasmus’ Strategy in Defense of De Libero Arbitrio,” Archiv für Reformations-
geschichte 78 (1987): 37-60.  
24 This effectively limits any constructive dialogue on the subject. For, in the defini-
tions themselves there is given no ground between an absolutely free will as previously 
defined and a will that is enslaved. Thus, it seems one must be a Pelagian or a determi-
nist.  
25 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 81. He states also on contingency, “If the will of 
God were such that, when the work had been done and while it yet remained in being, the 
will ceased . . . then it could be truly said that things happen contingently and mutably” 
(Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 81). Thus, since God is absolutely immutable for Lu-
ther, He cannot do anything “mutably” or contingently. This not only denies freedom to 
humans, but by implication to God himself. And because God is omnipotent, everything 
must happen necessarily, even though Luther would not utilize this terminology. For a 
discussion of the problem of the classical conception of divine immutability, see Bruce 
A. Ware, “An Evangelical Reexamination of the Doctrine of the Immutability of God," 
(1984; Dissertation presented to Fuller Theological Seminary). See also an interesting 
perspective in Isaak August Dorner, Divine Immutability: A Critical Reconsideration, 
trans. Robert R. Williams and Claude Welch (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994). 
26 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 81. McSorley contends that “Luther did not 
really grasp the distinction of the two kinds of necessity” (McSorley, 317).  
27 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 102. He maintains paradoxically that “The will, 
whether it be God’s or man’s, does what it does, good or bad, under no compulsion, but 
just as it wants or pleases, as if totally free” (Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 81). This is 
what is now called compatibilism, or sometimes monergism. For an excellent introduc-
tion to monergism, see Terrence L. Tiessen, Who Can Be Saved?: Reassessing Salvation 
in Christ and World Religions (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2004). For an excellent 
discussion of the issues and a moderate Calvinist view, see Norman Geisler, Chosen but 
Free (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1999). For an excellent and thorough collection of 
the contemporary debate on free will, see Robert Kane, ed., The Oxford Handbook of 
Free Will (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002). 
28 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 102. Here again it seems Luther is really talking 
about power, or potency. That one cannot do something for lack of power does not neces-
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will of man, is under necessity based on the immutability of God’s will 
and God’s decree, yet paradoxically the will is not compelled. 
The Will of Humanity. Based on these definitions, Luther’s view of 
the human will is clarified. According to Luther, there is a will in man, 
but it is not free. “You are no doubt right in assigning to man a will of 
some sort, but to credit him with a will that is free in the things of God is 
too much.”29 The term “free” makes the will too powerful. He reacts to 
any conception of this free will by saying, “what is here left to grace and 
the Holy Ghost? This is plainly to ascribe divinity to ‘free-will’!”30 But 
for Luther the will is not neutral; rather, because of sin, it is in total 
bondage. Luther therefore rejects free will due to its implication of a neu-
tral will that denies human sinfulness.31 
Luther does qualify this rejection. “I am not speaking of ‘natural be-
ing’, but of ‘gracious being’, as they call it. I know that ‘free-will’ can do 
some things by nature; it can eat, drink, beget, rule, etc.”32 Forde thus 
claims Luther is not teaching determinism writing, “It is something more 
                                                                                                         
sarily mean that one has no free will, especially if there were allowed a supplementary 
source of power, such as a prevenient grace. He further defines the term by saying, “This 
is what we mean by necessity of immutability: that the will cannot change itself, nor give 
itself another bent, but rather, is the more provoked to crave the more it is opposed, as its 
chafing proves; for this would not occur, were it free or had ‘free-will’” (Luther, The 
Bondage of the Will, 103). 
29 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 137. Luther is very concerned about upholding 
the sovereignty of God. This may have influenced his conception of the human will.  
30 Ibid., 140. It seems that the problem here lies primarily in the definition of free 
will. Erasmus has not argued for a conception of an omnipotent will, and he does not 
deny a place to the Holy Spirit. But Luther sees no middle ground that preserves his con-
cept of God’s sovereignty and grace. 
31 Gonzalez, 56. B. A. Gerrish notes that for Luther, “God has taken salvation out of 
the control of our wills and has placed it under the control of his. It is but a short step 
from here to a full-blown doctrine of divine determinism” (Brian A. Gerrish, The Old 
Protestantism and the New: Essays on the Reformation Heritage [Chicago: U of Chicago 
P, 1982], 135). 
32 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 265. This seems to contradict some other state-
ments. We will look at the internal coherence of Luther’s view in a subsequent section. 
Moreover, the Loci Communes, written by Luther’s companion Philip Melanchthon early 
in his career, makes it explicit that “If you relate human will (voluntas) to predestination, 
there is freedom neither in external nor internal acts, but all things take place according to 
divine determination” (Philip Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” in Melanchthon and 
Bucer, ed. Wilhelm Pauck [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969], 30). Thus, Melancthon 
makes clear that whether you speak of voluntas or arbitrium, there is no freedom in either 
when one holds that all takes place by divine determination. Melanchthon later revised 
his views on free will.  
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like an addiction. We all do what we want to do! That is precisely our 
bondage. We are not jerked around by a transcendent puppeteer.”33 At 
the same time, Luther paradoxically holds that everything happens ac-
cording to necessity of God’s immutability. Moreover, when it pertains 
to matters of salvation Luther unequivocally denies any role to the hu-
man will. When Erasmus questions what man would endeavor to repent 
if he were certain he had no free will. Luther replies “Nobody [will re-
form his life]! Nobody can! God has not time for your practitioners of 
self-reformation, for they are hypocrites. The elect, who fear God, will 
be reformed by His Holy Spirit.”34 Here we can see the strength of Lu-
ther’s sola gratia. For Luther, only God controls the will of man.35 
Moreover, God as the Creator meant “that God’s willing creates an abso-
lute necessity embracing all of his creation.”36  
The Will as Beast Ridden. Luther states unequivocally that “in all 
that bears on salvation or damnation, [man] has no ‘free-will,’ but is a 
captive, prisoner and bondslave, either to the will of God, or to the will 
of Satan.”37 He goes on to say, “For if a man has lost his freedom, and is 
                                                
33 Forde, 37. McSorley agrees, saying that Luther’s position is “not really a denial of 
man’s natural free will” (McSorley, 327). This is due to Luther’s position that man is free 
in immaterial matters but bound in matters of salvation. 
34 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 99. Moreover, Luther has clearly espoused that 
everything happens according to necessity by the will of God. Thus, even if we are doing 
“what we want to do,” it is still God who controls the will and controls all events. Thus, if 
we are not puppets, we are still seemingly like a computer that runs on software that is 
pre-programmed. 
35 He cites selected biblical verses to support this position. Among them are those 
that speak of God directing man’s steps, preparing hearts, and holding the power of salva-
tion (Jer 10:23; Prov 16:1; Rom 3:16).  
36 Kolb, 26, 29. Further, Luther was influenced toward this absoluteness of God’s 
will while studying at Erfurt, especially by Gabriel Biel, where he “assimilated a defini-
tion of God as the almighty Creator, who according to his absolute power could do any-
thing he pleases, who conformed to no external standard, who defined the Good by his 
Word or covenant.” Yet, he rejected Biel and Ockham’s view of human responsibility 
that gave some part to the will in salvation. McSorley contends that this position is not 
solely from Scripture but also includes “philosophical or metaphysical thinking,” thus he 
cannot claim to argue solely from Scripture (McSorley, 311).  
37 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 107. The inclusion of the possibility of being in 
bondage to Satan raises a question regarding the will of God and that of Satan. This prob-
lem will be taken up in a subsequent section. For a philosophical discussion of fore-
knowledge and free will, see Ted A. Warfield, “Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free-
dom Are Compatible,” Nous 31/1 (1997): 80-86. See also the critique of Warfield’s view 
by Anthony Brueckner, “On an Attempt to Demonstrate the Compatibility of Divine 
Foreknowledge and Human Freedom,” Faith and Philophy 17/1 (2000): 132-148. 
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forced to serve sin, and cannot will good, what conclusion can more 
justly be drawn concerning him, than that he sins and wills necessar-
ily?”38 Elsewhere Luther holds that no man has any power to change his 
will, for “God does not lie, but does all things immutably, and that his 
will can neither be resisted nor changed nor hindered.” 39 Luther com-
pares this captive will to a beast with either God or Satan as its rider. “If 
Satan rides, it goes where Satan wills. If God rides, it goes where God 
wills. In either case there is no ‘free choice.’”40 Yet, sin is still not God’s 
fault, for “the rider [God] of the horse is not responsible for the lameness 
which gives him a bad ride.”41 Moreover, under Satan’s sway man’s 
“reason (ratio) is blinded; his will (voluntas) is hostile to God; he wants 
only to sin; and his choice (arbitrium) is always sinful.”42 Thus, the will 
is bound to the will of its rider and can do nothing about it.43  
Erasmus questions Luther’s view and notes the “‘paradox that all we 
do is done, not by ‘free-will’ but of mere necessity and Augustine’s view 
that God works in us both good and evil; that He rewards His own good 
works in us, and punishes His own evil works in us?”44 Erasmus goes on 
“‘What a flood-gate of iniquity . . . would the spread of such news open 
to the people! What wicked man would amend his life? Who would be-
lieve that God loved him? Who would fight against his flesh?”45 Despite 
                                                
38 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 149. Luther uses the word “forced” here, yet 
elsewhere he claims the will is not compelled. 
39 Martin Luther, Career of the Reformer III, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald, 
and Helmut T. Lehmann, Luther’s Works (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1999), 33:42. On Lu-
ther’s view of choice, Kolb comments, “the reformer fashioned this new universe out of 
elements from his own personal experience and from his instruction at the university” 
(Kolb, 28). 
40 Forde, 58. 
41 Kolb, 53. Luther states, “It is the fault, therefore, of the instruments, which God 
does not allow to be idle, that evil things are done, with God himself setting them in mo-
tion. It is just as if a carpenter were cutting badly with a chipped and jagged ax. Hence it 
comes about that the ungodly man cannot but continually err and sin, because he is 
caught up in the movement of divine power and not allowed to be idle, but wills, desires, 
and acts according to the kind of person he himself is” (Luther, Career of the Reformer 
III, 176). 
42 Packer and Johnston, 49. Notice the fluctuation between God and Satan as the 
controller of the will.  
43 Packer and Johnston state that “If man could choose his own rider, his will would 
indeed be free, and he would be sovereign over his own salvation” (ibid., 53). However, 
the Bible does speak of resisting the devil (James 4:7). 
44 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 97. 
45 Ibid. 
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Erasmus’ point, Luther refuses to wrestle with this issue. “It should be 
enough to simply say that God has willed . . . and the reason of the Di-
vine will is not to be sought, but simply to be adored.”46 
 
Luther’s View of Soteriology 
The Human Condition. The condition of humanity is foundational 
to Luther’s view of salvation, especially the total depravity of man’s na-
ture (Gen 6:5,21).47 This is a primary basis for his soteriology. He states, 
“If we believe that Christ has redeemed human creatures by his blood, 
we are bound to confess that the whole human being was lost. Otherwise, 
we should make Christ either superfluous or the redeemer of only the 
lowest part of humanity . . . and that would be blasphemy and sacri-
lege.”48 Further, he writes, “salvation is not of our own strength or coun-
sel, but depends on the working of God alone . . . does it not clearly fol-
low that when God is not present to work in us, all is evil, and of neces-
sity we act in a way that contributes nothing towards salvation?”49 This 
view of salvation is tied to his belief in justification by faith in which 
“God does everything necessary for salvation.”50 Thus, there is no part 
that man plays in his own salvation. For Luther, anything man could do 
would only detract from the glory of God. Rather, “‘the best, infallible 
preparation for grace, and the only disposing factor for its reception, is 
God’s eternal choosing and predestination.’”51 Therefore, “man’s destiny 
                                                
46 Ibid., 100. For an interesting view that Erasmus’ fate was to lay the groundwork 
for this reformatory work, see Terrence M. Reynolds, “Was Erasmus Responsible for 
Luther?: A Study of the Relationship of the Two Reformers and Their Clash over the 
Question of the Will,” Concordia Theological Quarterly 41/4 (1977): 18-34. 
47 The will is completely evil and in bondage. “The whole man is captured by sin, 
not just certain portions of man” (Mark Migotti, “Luther’s Word on Man’s Will: A Case 
Study in Comparative Intellectual History,” Religious Studies 20/D (1984): 660). 
48 Luther, Career of the Reformer III, 293. On the importance of the view of the sin-
fulness of sin for postmodernity, see a brief but nuanced discussion by Kathryn A. Klein-
hans, “The Bondage of the Will as Good News for Postmodern Selves,” Dialog 39/2 
(2000): 93-98. 
49 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 102. 
50 McGrath, 100. 
51 Luther, Career of the Reformer III, 190. Some , like Kenneth Hagen, claim that 
Luther did not hold the view of double predestination. Hagen writes, “Only in connection 
with the doctrine of redemption is an evangelical doctrine of predestination possible” 
(Kenneth Hagen, “Luther’s Understanding of the Bondage of the Will, and the Problem 
of Free Will in Melanchthon and Later Theologians,” Reformation & Revival 7/4 (1998): 
139. Moreover, he writes, “while He [God] creates in man the possibility to believe, the 
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depends entirely upon the free decision of God.”52 Luther considered this 
belief in a bound will “the corner-stone of the gospel and the very foun-
dation of faith.”53  
Grace and Divine Mercy. In Luther’s theology it is supremely clear 
that humans cannot be saved unless the grace of God works in them. For 
“nothing we do has any saving significance prior to His working in us.”54 
There is no place for the will in matters of salvation, but only grace. 
Erasmus holds man has free will and simultaneously allows that grace is 
needed for man to will good. Luther finds this inconsistent, saying, “man 
without grace cannot will good . . . so there is found in your ‘free-will’ at 
the same moment a yes and a no”55 Yet, might there be room for a will 
that can accept or reject the grace of God? For Luther, to allow this 
would be an offense to the power of God’s grace. “If God’s grace is 
wanting, if it is taken away from that small power [of the will that Eras-
mus posits] what can it do?”56 On the contrary, humans can do nothing 
without God’s grace. “Hence, it follows that “free will” without God’s 
grace is not free at all, but is the permanent prisoner and bondslave of 
evil.”57 There is no halfway between salvation and damnation. “For if 
God is in us, Satan is out of us, and then it is present with us to will only 
good.”58 Thus grace is all in all.  
He also raises the issue of meritorious works. This exemplifies his 
overarching concern about faith versus works and his dispute with Ro-
man Catholicism. He will not allow any salvific part to the will, for this 
might mean the will has somehow merited salvation. He states, “if ‘free-
will’ merits a ‘tiny bit’, and grace the rest, why does ‘free-will’ receive 
the total reward?”59 Even the slightest will in man becomes, for him, sal-
vation by works. He leaves no room for unmerited grace as a gift that can 
be accepted or rejected. It is clear, then, that Luther felt he needed to 
                                                                                                         
ability to reject remains” (Hagen, 140). However, Hagen does not cite Luther on this 
point, and Luther suggests much to the contrary throughout The Bondage of the Will. 
52 Packer and Johnston, 53. 
53 Ibid., 43. 
54 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 102. 
55 Ibid., 145. He continues his critique of Erasmus and finds it inconsistent that 
“though [the will] by its own power it can only go down, and can go up only with the 
help of another” (ibid., 143). 
56 Ibid., 104. 
57 Ibid. There seems to be lacking here a distinction between power and will which 
might be a helpful nuance. 
58 Ibid., 147. 
59 Ibid., 237. 
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deny free will to maintain the sovereignty of God’s grace, and thus the 
whole basis of his theology, “for this was the real matter under debate.”60 
Because of his concept of salvation, central to his reforms, he was 
obliged to “uphold the absolute necessity of God’s grace for every hu-
man act that has any relevance for salvation.”61 There is no place for con-
tingency; all is performed by the will and the power of God. The will is 
bound, and thus, salvation is bestowed solely by God, with no input from 
the human will. Luther states, “to believers he [God] gives the righteous-
ness of God; to unbelievers he [God] denies it.”62  
 
Luther’s Biblical Interpretation 
Luther relies on many texts to support his interpretation of the bond-
age of the will. Some prominent ones include “I know whom I have cho-
sen” (John 13:18) and “The Lord knoweth them that are his” (2 Tim 
2:19).63 This, coupled with Luther’s view of foreknowledge as God’s 
decree, asserts a predestinarian view of salvation. He also references 
Isaiah 46:10, “Declaring the end from the beginning, And from ancient 
times things that are not yet done, Saying, ‘My counsel shall stand, And I 
will do all My pleasure.” Moreover, God made “promises before the 
world began” and “whom he will he hardeneth” (Tit 1:2; Rom 9:18,22). 
Luther also references the narrative of Balaam in Num 22, claiming it as 
proof against free will. “Thus Balaam’s inability to say what he wished is 
a clear proof from the Scriptures that man is not in his own power, nor 
free in choosing and doing what he does. Were it not so, no such case 
could stand in the Scriptures.”64 
Love of Jacob, Hatred of Esau. Luther finds some of his most 
prominent examples in Rom 9. He begins by discussing Romans 9:13, 
where God declares “Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated.” Luther 
comments, “God chose Jacob and chose him before he was born . . . He 
                                                
60 Packer and Johnston, 47. 
61 McSorley, 304. McSorley goes on to say, “Despite some ambiguities, Luther’s 
early attacks on free will should be interpreted as a defense of the Augustinian doctrine of 
the powerlessness of free will without grace in matters of salvation” (McSorley, 369). 
Packer and Johnston contend that the alternative would be that “Man earns his passage; 
man, in the last analysis, saves himself” (Packer and Johnston, 49). Forde agrees saying, 
“The entire gospel is destroyed if one tries like Erasmus, and most theologians still do 
these days, to avoid the problem of necessity” (Forde, 68). 
62 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 290. 
63 Ibid., 71. 
64 Ibid., 259.  
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so hated Esau that He removed his place of abode in the desert.”65 This is 
a primary proof for the decrees of God. Luther goes on to accuse Israel 
of being ungrateful for the grace of God. “I know that men are grafted in 
by faith and cut off by unbelief, and that they must be exhorted to be-
lieve, lest they be cut off. But it does not hence follow, nor does this 
prove, that they can believe or disbelieve by the power of ‘free-will’, 
which is the point we are discussing.”66 Even still, he holds that we have 
no will either to believe or not to believe. “Paul teaches that faith and 
unbelief come to us by no work of our own, but through the love and 
hatred of God.”67 
Pharaoh. Luther also utilizes the hardening of Pharaoh that Paul 
speaks of in Romans 9. He writes that Pharaoh “allowed his own un-
godly corruption, under Satan’s sway, to blaze with anger, to swell with 
pride, to boil with rage and to advance along the path of scornful reck-
lessness.”68 This would not have occurred without the effective will of 
God, for “His evil will would not have been moved or hardened of itself, 
but as the omnipotent Agent makes it act . . .”69 Thus God acts on Phar-
aoh’s heart. “God presents from without to his villainous heart that which 
by nature he hates; at the same time, He continues by omnipotent action 
to move within him the evil which he finds there.”70 Notice that God is 
the causative agent, yet from within; this helps us understand Luther’s 
concept that the will is not compelled, yet at the same time, in bondage. 
Erasmus, contrastingly, holds that “God hardens when He does not 
straightway punish the sinner.”71 But, for Luther, under the decree of 
God Pharaoh had no choice but to be hardened. If it were not so, “God 
could not with such certainty have foretold his hardening.”72 Thus, he 
                                                
65 Ibid., 227. Luther interprets this somewhat differently in his commentary on Ro-
mans, where he views this as a statement that natural descent is of no value. He writes, “It 
did not help Esau that he descended from so good a father and so good a mother . . . How 
much less will it benefit the unbelieving Jews who are born so long afterwards . . .” 
(Martin Luther, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, trans. J. Theodore Mueller 
[Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1976], 122). He does go on, however, to assert that this election 
of Jacob was, in fact, salvific (124). 
66 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 228. 
67 Ibid., 229. 
68 Ibid., 206. 
69 Ibid., 207. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., 195. Luther actually considers this “plausible” but does not accept it, asking 
“how is it proved?” (ibid.,195). 
72 Ibid., 211. 
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must have caused it. “If He [God] cannot lie, then Pharaoh cannot but be 
hardened.”73  
The Potter and the Clay. On Paul’s reference to the potter and the 
clay in Romans 9:19-23, Luther states, “He is speaking of men, compar-
ing them to clay, and God to a potter.”74 Thus, God is the only agent in 
this operation, and the clay cannot form itself. Erasmus appeals to the 
other places where this metaphor arises in the OT, but Luther rejects this 
approach. He writes, “Paul does not appear to have taken this passage 
from the prophets . . .”75 Yet, it is clear that Paul is alluding to the promi-
nent OT appearances of this metaphor. Nevertheless, for Luther this pas-
sage shows the omnipotence of God and absolute lack of free will in 
man. It is obvious that we are the clay and don’t control our circum-
stances, “for there is no doubt that afflictions come from God against our 
will, and impose on us necessity of bearing them.”76 Thus, Luther con-
siders his position to be on firm biblical footing. According to his meth-
odology, Romans 9 alone would give him enough proof of his position. 
 
Issues in Luther’s View of the Human Will 
Foreknowledge and Free Will. Luther sees the problem strictly as 
“whether God foresees anything contingently, or whether we do all 
things of necessity.”77 Luther is explicit in his answer that “God fore-
knows nothing contingently, but that He foresees, purposes, and does all 
things according to His own immutable, eternal, and infallible will.”78 In 
other words, His foreknowledge is bound to His decree—they are the 
same. He admits that there is an illusion of free will. Yet, “however it 
                                                
73 Ibid., 212. Fifteen years later, Luther was asked about the hardening of the heart, 
“Luther averred that God’s hardening of the Egyptian should be understood ‘literally’ 
(proprie) rather than ‘figuratively,’ but not as if God actively caused the rejection in 
Pharaoh’s heart because ‘God does not do evil though his omnipotence does all things. 
God hardened Pharaoh, who was evil, by not sending him his Spirit and his grace. Why 
such things happen lies beyond proper human inquiry’” (Martin Luther, Tischreden, Dr. 
Martin Luther’s Werke [Weimar: Bohlau, 1883-1993], 4:642-43; quoted in Kolb, 53).  
74 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 219. 
75 Ibid., 229. 
76 Ibid., 230. Luther here seems to refer to external factors that limit the possibilities 
of the human will. However, it seems extreme for Luther to suggest that external factors 
amount to “necessity.” On the contrary, it seems more than possible that the issue of ex-
ternal influences and/or constraints does not require a total denial of free will but, rather, 
the exclusion of an absolutely free or omnipotent will. 
77 Ibid., 79. 
78 Ibid., 80. 
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may appear to us to be done mutably and contingently, it is in reality 
done necessarily and immutably in respect of God’s will.”79 Luther, ac-
cordingly, asks how one who believes in contingency can believe God’s 
promises. Further, Luther asks the question, “Do you suppose that He 
does not will what He foreknows, or that he does not foreknow what He 
wills?”80 Luther sees no will that thwarts God’s will, all happens accord-
ing to God’s determining. 
He takes the case of Judas to illustrate his point:  
 
If God foreknew that Judas would be a traitor, Judas became a 
traitor of necessity, and it was not in the power of Judas or of 
any creature to act differently, or to change his will, from that 
which God had foreseen. It is true that Judas acted willingly, 
and not under compulsion, but his willing was the work of 
God, brought into being by His omnipotence, like everything 
else.81 
 
He goes on to assert “it would certainly be a hard question, I allow—
indeed, an insoluble one—if you sought to establish both the foreknowl-
edge of God and the freedom of man together.”82 Moreover, he states, 
“Either God makes mistakes in His foreknowledge, and errors in His ac-
tion (which is impossible), or else we act, and are caused to act, accord-
ing to foreknowledge and action.”83 This is in accord with Luther’s view 
of necessity, the will and foreknowledge of God are bound up together in 
His decrees. Nevertheless, “Judas betrayed Christ willingly. My point is 
that this act of will in Judas was certainly infallibly bound to take place, 
if God foreknew it.”84 Therefore, there was no other alternative, for “how 
could Judas change his will while God’s infallible foreknowledge 
stands?”85 When Luther states that Judas sinned willingly, he does not 
mean that Judas could have done otherwise, but simply that he did what 
was in his will to do. This does not refer to freedom, but the nuance of 
lack of compulsion.  
                                                
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., 213. 
82 Ibid., 215. He even uses the Gentile belief in fate for support saying “for even the 
Gentiles ascribed to their gods ‘fate inevitable’!” (ibid., 216). 
83 Ibid., 217. 
84 Ibid., 220. 
85 Ibid. 
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However, is it true that God’s foreknowledge must deprive man of 
freedom? Must contingency and freedom injure God’s foreknowledge?86 
For Luther, the answer is yes. However, consider this example. A free 
agent may choose to read this or choose not to read this. That God knows 
you would read this does not necessarily entail that you have no choice. 
The perceived problem is that if God knew before what you would do, 
then you have no choice in the present. However, the problem is not the 
perfect knowledge of your action, but the timing of the action.87 Rather, 
if the problem is conceived from a different angle, it may be that if you 
would not read this, God would have known you would not read it. In 
other words, God would not be in error in His foreknowledge, but He 
would foreknow your free decisions themselves.88 Nevertheless, because 
                                                
86 The issue of God’s foreknowledge has been a subject of great discussion recently. 
For a critical analysis of God’s foreknowledge in relation to his freedom, see the view of 
Open Theism. For an excellent introduction to Open Theism by multiple proponents, see 
Clark H. Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, David Basinger, The 
Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Down-
ers Grove: InterVarsity, 1994). See also William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 
Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1989); Clark H. Pin-
nock, The Grace of God, the Will of Man: A Case for Arminianism (Grand Rapids: Aca-
demie, 1989). For further delineations of this view, see Gregory A. Boyd, God at War : 
The Bible & Spiritual Conflict (Downer’s Grove: InterVarsity, 1997); John Sanders, The 
God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1998). For a 
thorough investigation and critique, see Millard J. Erickson, What Does God Know and 
When Does He Know It? (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003). See also William Lane 
Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Freedom (New 
York: Leiden, 1991); William Lane Craig, “Hasker on Divine Knowledge,” Philosophi-
cal Studies 67 (1992): 57-78; Norman L Geisler, H. Wayne House, and Max Herrera, The 
Battle for God: Responding to the Challenge of Neotheism (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2001); 
Steve Nichols, “An Early Response to Open Theism,” Reformation and Revival 12/2 
(2003): 111-129. 
87 This raises the question of God’s relation to time. The possibility remains that 
God transcends time so that His foreknowledge does not create the time problems that we 
perceive. How he does this is unknown, but it may be possible. This is not to assert that 
God is timeless, or ahistorical, but that He is not necessarily restricted by time. For an 
excellent and brief discussion of the historicity of God and foreknowledge in relation to 
free will, see Fernando Canale, “Doctrine of God,” in Handbook of Seventh-Day Advent-
ist Theology, ed. Raoul Dederen (Hagerstown: Review and Herald, 2000). For a critique 
of timelessness and presentation of God’s historicity and analogical temporality, see 
Fernando Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primor-
dial Presuppositions (Berrien Springs: Andrews UP, 1987). 
88 This is a very controversial and complicated question in contemporary discussion. 
A detailed discussion of this problem is beyond the scope of this project. However, for an 
excellent discussion of these issues see Kane, ed. 
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of Luther’s definition of foreknowledge as nearly synonymous with the 
will and of omnipotence as causation of every action in the world, he 
must hold this view: “If the foreknowledge and omnipotence of God are 
admitted, then we must be under necessity.”89  
Divine Will and Human Responsibility. Luther’s rejection of any 
freedom of the will begs the question, is it coherent to assert that the hu-
man will is bound and that it is responsible for sin and deserving of pun-
ishment? How can one be morally responsible for one’s actions, if they 
are the only actions one could take? Luther comments: 
 
I say that man without the grace of God nonetheless remains 
under the general omnipotence of the God who effects, moves, 
and impels all things in a necessary, infallible course; but the 
fact of man’s thus being carried along is ‘nothing’—that is, 
avails nothing in God’s sight, nor is reckoned anything but 
sin.90 
 
All humans are responsible for their own actions and sinners deserv-
ing of punishment. Luther allows “merely that the creature co-operates 
with the operation of God!”91 He goes on to state, “Paul co-operates with 
God in teaching the Corinthians; he preaches without, and God teaches 
within. The work of each is in that case distinct.”92 Moreover, “all things, 
even the ungodly, co-operate with God.”93 Luther is thus not always con-
sistent in his pastoral concerns about the will. For instance, he often 
speaks as though the will can be negatively affected by the writings of 
Erasmus. He also states, “For as long as they do not know the limits of 
their ability, they will not know what they should do, they cannot repent 
                                                
89 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 218. 
90 Ibid., 265. In an interesting and brief article Roland Goeden wrestles with the im-
plications of a will in bondage for religious education. He accepts Luther’s view and 
comes to the conclusion that it is liberating, saying, “If nothing is at stake, then I can fight 
for justice, peace, and better environment, sometimes more relaxed than as if everything 
depends on my success and on being a model” (Roland Goeden, “Luther’s ‘Bondage of 
the Will’ and Its Contribution to Education,” Religious Education 80 (Spring 1985): 271. 
However, this begs the question, why fight at all? Moreover, what if one’s actions really 
do affect the world and responsibilities are neglected due to a false sense of compla-
cency?  
91 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 267. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid.  
JOURNAL OF THE ADVENTIST THEOLOGICAL SOCIETY 
290 
when they err . . .”94 Elsewhere he counsels, “‘If you accept the gospel 
and God’s Word and cling to it and grasp it, and remain faithful to the 
end, then you will be saved, and if not, you will be damned, 2 Timothy 
2:[12].”95 This seems to imply that human beings have some control over 
whether or not they will repent.96 However, this has already been cate-
gorically denied elsewhere.  
Accordingly, this “co-operation” should not be confused with a free 
operation on the human will’s part. Luther seems to only mean that hu-
mans are not compelled in their actions. Nonetheless, those actions are 
willed by God, and the human will is bound in its course. The lack of 
compulsion simply denotes the belief that humans don’t act against their 
will because their will itself is bound.97 So, when a human acts, it is 
never compelled against its will, yet the very will is controlled by God. 
Consequently, human beings seem to merit their own punishment but 
not reward. Yet, only “God makes believers righteous, and unbelievers 
ungodly, unrighteous, under wrath.”98 Thus, Luther holds that humans 
are justly condemned. The unrighteous deserve destruction, even though 
they cannot do otherwise but be unrighteous. He states, “To say man 
does not seek God, is the same as saying: man cannot seek God . . . If 
there were potency or power in man to will good, the movement of Di-
vine omnipotence would not suffer it to remain inactive or keep holi-
day.”99 How, then, can God be just if he arbitrarily selects, from eternity, 
who will be saved and who will be damned? Kolb notes the enormity of 
                                                
94 Ibid., 78. Luther makes many statements to this effect that imply detriment from 
Erasmus’ doctrines by making people think in error. Yet, if God wills all that happens, it 
does not follow that any human’s salvation should be affected by a misunderstanding, or 
that one would change one’s mind if one knew better. 
95 Martin Luther, Briefe, Dr. Martin Luther’s Werke (Weimar: Bohlau, 1883-1993), 
10:492-494, 494.214-218; quoted in Kolb, 41.  
96 Forde notes that the language of free choice “is so firmly embedded in the lan-
guage that we would be rendered virtually speechless in our speaking about human activ-
ity and morals without it . . .” (48). Yet this very language is used consistently in the Bi-
ble. Luther himself uses the “language of willing” in his own writing and speaking (49). 
This is especially true of his speaking on Christian conduct. He states, “A Christian man 
is the most free Lord of all, and subject to none; a Christian man is the most dutiful ser-
vant of all, and subject to everyone” (Martin Luther, Christian Liberty, trans. A. A. 
Bucchheim [Philadelphia: United Lutheran, 1929], 6). 
97 Forde comments, “We do what we want. And that is just the trouble! We are 
bound to do what we want.” Forde, 54. 
98 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 275. 
99 Ibid., 281. 
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this issue, saying, “The tension between the two defies solution, in spite 
of the best efforts of human reason.”100 Luther is clear: “God, he says, 
works every human deed, whether good or evil. He works in the evil man 
according to that man’s nature, as He finds it.”101 Therefore all responsi-
bility lies with God for good and for evil. 
The Divine Will and the Will of Satan. There is some ambiguity in 
regard to the relationship of Satan in Luther’s view. As part of his denial 
of free will, Luther emphasizes Satan as holding the human will in bond-
age. He writes, “in all that bears on salvation or damnation, [one] has no 
‘free-will,’ but is a captive, prisoner and bondslave, either to the will of 
God, or to the will of Satan.”102 This theme runs throughout Luther’s po-
lemic. He also states, “how mighty is the dominion and power of Satan 
over the sons of men, which prevents them hearing and grasping the 
plainest words of God.”103 Therefore man cannot be the cause of sin. 
Rather, “the cause is the wickedness of Satan, who is enthroned and 
reigns over us in our weakness, and who himself resists the Word of 
God. If Satan did not do so, the whole world could be converted by a 
single word of God, heard once; there would be no need of more.”104 So 
Satan actively works against God. Does this mean that he has freedom? 
Does he work against the immutable will of God? Luther acknowledges 
that Satan blinds people, saying some “by reason, of the working of Sa-
tan, their god, cannot see the plainest proofs of the Trinity in the God-
head and of the humanity of Christ.”105 He goes on to say: 
 
So the Word of God and the traditions of men fight each other 
in implacable opposition. God and Satan are personally en-
gaged in this same conflict, each labouring [sic] to destroy the 
works and subvert the doctrines of the other, like two kings 
                                                
100 Kolb, 64. According to McSorley this idea of bondage of the will “makes it im-
possible . . . to give a satisfactory explanation of man’s responsibility for sin” (McSorley, 
340). Kolb calls this an “insoluble problem of how God can condemn those who were 
born in sin and guilt and have no power of their own to free themselves” (Kolb, 64). 
101 Packer and Johnston, 51. 
102 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 107. 
103 Ibid., 133. 
104 Ibid., 134. 
105 Ibid., 73. Luther utilizes Jesus’ teaching about Satan as “the strong man” in Luke 
11. He goes on to assert that “if a stronger appears, and overcomes Satan, we are once 
more servants and captives, but now desiring and willingly doing what He wills—which 
is royal freedom” (ibid., 103). 
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laying waste each other’s kingdoms. ‘He that is not with me,’ 
said Christ, ‘is against me.’ (Luke 11.23)106 
 
This is actually characterized by Luther as a real war; he states, 
“there is no middle kingdom between the kingdom of God and the king-
dom of Satan, which are ever at war with each other.”107 Satan, in this 
war, prevents man from choosing to serve God. “The power of ‘free-
will’ amounts to this: because Satan rules over it, it rejects even grace, 
and the Spirit who fulfils the law—so excellently do its own ‘endeavour’ 
and ‘effort’ avail to fulfil the law.”108 
Yet how can Satan war against God? Would this not entail that Satan 
has a free will of his own? If one applies the same rules to Satan’s will as 
to the human will, this is impossible. If God determines all from eternity 
past and is absolutely immutable, Satan can have no free will. Thus, in 
order for Luther to be consistent, God must actually be controlling Satan, 
and God Himself holds humans in bondage and is, in effect, working 
against Himself. Is it possible to reconcile these seemingly opposed 
viewpoints? Luther, contrary to what he elsewhere implies, admits that 
God is behind the works of Satan, saying, “He moves and works of ne-
cessity even in Satan and the ungodly. But He works according to what 
they are, and what He finds them to be: which means, since they are evil 
and perverted themselves, that when they are impelled to action by this 
movement of Divine omnipotence they do only that which is perverted 
and evil.”109 Therefore, God’s omnipotence holds primacy, regardless of 
the consequences for His character. 
Luther himself acknowledges the apparent contradiction at this junc-
ture. He says, “If I could by any means understand how this same God, 
who makes such a show of wrath and unrighteousness, can yet be merci-
ful and just, there would be no need for faith.”110 Thus, he seems re-
signed to the fact that he does not understand how God can be just, and at 
the same time condemn humans to eternal death based only on His im-
mutable will. This brings us to the problem of God’s justice, the problem 
of theodicy which is tied to the doctrine of the human will. 
                                                
106 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 93. 
107 Ibid., 253. 
108 Ibid., 188. 
109 Ibid., 204.  Packer and Johnston write, “it is God who energises [sic] Satan, ac-
cording to his nature, and such power as Satan has is held and exercised by God’s own 
appointment” (Packer and Johnston, 51). 
110 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 101. 
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The Problem of Theodicy. The question of free will is very closely 
related to theodicy. There is a “persistent problem that arises when God 
is seen as condemning those whom He wills not to save.”111 Luther ac-
knowledges this difficulty but deflects the immediate question by focus-
ing on the theology of the cross.112 Even amidst the question of God’s 
justice, Luther “trusted that the God who had come to engage evil at its 
ugliest on the cross would triumph finally over evil.”113 Yet, this does not 
answer why God condemns some and saves others based on His will 
alone. Luther himself struggles with this problem, saying: 
 
And who would not stumble at it? I have stumbled at it myself 
more than once, down to the deepest pit of despair, so that I 
wished I had never been a man . . . this is why so much toil 
and trouble has been devoted to clearing the goodness of God, 
throwing the blame on man’s will.114 
 
Luther admits the difficulty but cannot affirm free will, saying:  
 
Though He saves so few and damns so many; to believe that 
He is just, though of His own will He makes us perforce 
proper subjects for damnation, and seems (in Erasmus’ words) 
‘to delight in the torments of poor wretches and to be a fitter 
object for hate than for love.’115 
 
Even though it is beyond understanding, Luther asserts that when 
“God saves those who don’t deserve it ‘man’s heart does not accuse . . . 
nor demand to know why He wills to do so.’”116 But what about those 
who are lost? He goes on to say: 
 
Why then does He not alter those evil wills which He moves? 
This question touches on the secrets of His majesty, where 
‘His judgments are past finding out’ (cf. Rom. 11.33). It is not 
for us to inquire into these mysteries, but to adore them. If 
                                                
111 Tiessen, 15. 
112 For a thorough and scholarly discussion of Luther’s theology of the cross see 
Alister McGrath, Luther’s Theology of the Cross: Martin Luther’s Theological Break-
through (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). 
113 Kolb, 63. 
114 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 217. 
115 Ibid., 101. 
116 Ibid., 234. 
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flesh and blood take offence here, and grumble, well, let them 
grumble.117 
 
Luther’s contention that one ought not be troubled by this issue does 
not seem satisfactory. The problem of evil and God’s justice is too real 
and present to dismiss lightly. The problem was very real for Luther, and 
he honestly had no satisfactory answer, but he believed in the goodness 
of God by faith. Luther’s faith in God is admirable, but the question of 
God’s goodness still remains. 
The Hidden God. How did Luther attempt to conceive of the justice 
of God? The main attempt is the concept of the deus absconditus, the 
hidden God. Roland Bainton states that for Luther, “there are almost two 
Gods, the inscrutable God whose ways are past finding out and the God 
made known to us in Christ.”118 Luther seemingly retained the idea of 
God hidden as vestige “from his Ockhamist instructors” that God is be-
yond human grasp.119 God is unknowable beyond what is revealed, and, 
thus, hidden.120 God revealed is found primarily in the incarnation. Lu-
ther imagines Jesus saying, “‘from an unrevealed God I will become a 
revealed God. Nevertheless, I will remain the same God. I will be made 
flesh, or send My Son . . .’”121  
 Luther holds Isaiah 45:7 as an example that God creates evil. It says, 
“I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the 
                                                
117 Ibid., 208. He goes on to say, “Why did God let Adam fall, and why did He cre-
ate us all tainted with the same sin, when He might have kept Adam safe, and might have 
created us of other material, or of seed that had first been cleansed? God is He for Whose 
will no cause or ground may be laid down as its rule or standard. . . . If any rule or stan-
dard, or cause or ground, existed for it, it could no longer be the will of God” (ibid., 209). 
118 Roland H. Bainton, Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther (New York: Meridian, 
1995), 48. For an interesting study of reflection on this concept of Luther, see John Dil-
lenberger, God Hidden and Revealed: The Interpretation of Luther’s Deus Absconditus 
and Its Significance for Religious Thought (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1953). 
119 Kolb, 35. 
120 Steven Paulson states that “it is not so much that God cannot be seen that con-
cerns Luther, but that God actually and actively hides” (Steven D. Paulson, “Luther on 
the Hidden God,” Word & World 19 (Fall 1999): 363. 
121 Martin Luther, Lectures on Genesis: Chapters 26-30, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, Hilton 
C. Oswald, and Helmut T. Lehmann, Luther’s Works, (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1999), 
5:45. However, behind this “revealed dualism of cosmic conflict between God and evil 
lies the hidden mystery of absolute Divine sovereignty; evil is brought to expression only 
by the omnipotent working of the good God” (Packer and Johnston, 51). Forde comments 
that “Luther could even say that apart from Jesus God is indistinguishable from the devil” 
(Forde, 45). 
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LORD do all these things.” However, this evil might be understood as 
being in contrast to peace, often meaning prosperity and calamity. This 
need not be in reference to ontological evil.122 Yet Luther is uncon-
vinced; he holds that God Himself creates evil and good in His hidden 
will, hence He is the author not just of goodness, but also of evil. “Thus 
God conceals His eternal mercy and loving kindness beneath eternal 
wrath, His righteousness beneath unrighteousness.”123 How are we to 
understand this internal dualism in God’s nature? Can it be reconciled 
with the justice of God? In Ezekiel 18:32, God Himself declares His de-
sire for life, not death, “For I have no pleasure in the death of him that 
dieth.”124 Erasmus says “If He does not will our death, it must be laid to 
the charge of our own will if we perish.”125 
Here is Luther’s response to the biblical statement: 
 
Ezekiel speaks of the published offer of God’s mercy, not of 
the dreadful hidden will of God, Who, according to His own 
counsel, ordains such persons as He wills to receive and par-
taken of the mercy preached and offered. This will is not to be 
inquired into, but to be reverently adored, as by far the most 
awesome secret of the Divine Majesty. He has kept it to Him-
self, and forbidden us to know it; and it is much more worthy 
of reverence than an infinite number of Corycian caverns!126 
 
So, must it be assumed that God is not here speaking the whole 
truth? Is the “published offer” of God different from His real will? But to 
avoid further consideration of this incongruency, Luther counsels that we 
                                                
122 There are also a number of passages throughout the writings of the prophets in 
the OT which state that the Lord brings evil, but these are in the context of discipline for 
sin. Another passage Luther utilizes is 1 Sam 2:6, “The Lord killed and maketh alive; He 
bringeth down to the grave and bringeth up.” For Luther this shows that God brings forth 
good and evil. However, this passage is in the context of God’s relation to an already 
sinful planet. That God punishes is not the same as Him bringing forth evil into existence 
and willing all evil on the earth. He also mentions Isaiah 63:17 that asks the Lord “why 
has thou made us to err?” In contrast to Luther, Jerome and Origen claim that “He is said 
to “make to err” in that He does not at once recall from error” (Luther, The Bondage of 
the Will, 195). 
123 Ibid., 101. Gerrish states that this is “a moment antithetical to the attributes of 
mercy and love. The image of God does not, after all, fully coincide with the picture of 
Jesus” (Gerrish, The Old Protestantism and the New: Essays on the Reformation Heri-
tage, 138). 
124 See also 1 Tim 2:5-6; Tit 2:11; 2 Pet 3:9. 
125 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 167. 
126 Ibid., 169. 
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should not think of these things. “Wherever God hides Himself, and wills 
to be unknown to us, there we have no concern.”127 He claims the prob-
lem lies in the interpreter that “makes no distinction between God 
preached and God hidden.”128 However, the Bible seems to make the op-
posite distinction, that God is always the same. Malachi 3:6 asserts that 
God is not arbitrary, but that men can take confidence in His perfect 
character, “For I am the Lord, I change not.” Yet, in order to try to har-
monize God’s call to sinners in Scripture and a lack of will in man, he 
uses the construction of two different wills in one God. “Thus, He does 
not will the death of a sinner—that is, in His word, but He wills it by His 
inscrutable will.”129 Gerrish comments that this view has the “fearful cost 
of reducing the universal benevolence of the revealed will to a mere ap-
pearance.”130 Beyond this, by the very principle of Scripture as a basis 
for all doctrine, by sola scriptura itself, God “in His word” is the stan-
dard. How can we say regarding God the opposite of what He says about 
Himself in the Bible? Thus it is very problematic to claim two wills in 
God and leaves the problem of theodicy in full force. 
 
Analysis of Biblical Support 
It is important to look at Luther’s use of biblical texts to support his 
doctrine about the bondage of the will. Do his texts clearly teach this 
doctrine? As we consider his use of Scripture we should note, as Justo 
Gonzalez puts it, that “Luther felt free to take certain liberties with the 
canon of Scripture, while still insisting on the primacy of Scripture over 
tradition.”131 As we saw earlier, Luther reinterpreted the “righteousness 
of God” to refer to His impartation of righteousness alone. He came to 
this understanding by utilizing the questionable methodology of the “tro-
pological sense” of Scripture.132 Furthermore, Gonzalez states, Luther 
                                                
127 Ibid., 170. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. He goes on to say, “So it is right to say: ‘If God does not desire our death, it 
must be laid to the charge of our own will if we perish’: this, I repeat, is right if you 
spoke of God preached” (ibid., 171. 
130 Gerrish, The Old Protestantism and the New: Essays on the Reformation Heri-
tage, 144. 
131 Gonzalez, 49.  
132 McGrath, Reformation Thought: An Introduction, 101. This was based on a 
method of interpretation called the Quadriga where Scripture was considered to have four 
senses. These were the literal, allegorical, tropological, and anagogical. In the tropologi-
cal sense, “certain passages were interpreted to produce ethical guidance for Christian 
conduct.” For more on this see McGrath, 148. 
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“felt free to confess that he was inclined to toss [James] out of the canon 
. . . Therefore, Luther was no biblicist. His primary authority was not the 
canon of the Bible, but the gospel that he found in the Bible and that was 
the touchstone for its interpretation.”133  
We have seen many texts that Luther uses to support his doctrine; let 
us now examine these.134 Luther’s use of Romans 9 as a proof of predes-
tination is widely disputed. For instance, the context seems to refer not to 
the question of how people are saved but to the question of whether God 
has lived up to His promises to His chosen people Israel. Thus, by refer-
ring to God’s loving Jacob, Paul is pointing to the fact that Israel was 
chosen by God through no merit of its own.135 Israel has no claim to ex-
clusivity because God is free to bestow mercy on whom He will, specifi-
cally, to the Gentiles. Yet, He has not rejected Israel, but the Gentiles 
also will be “grafted in.” Christ has made a way for anyone to come to 
Christ. Thus, seemingly, the passage lends itself to a widening of the 
availability of salvation rather than God’s choosing of whom He will 
save and whom He will damn. 
 The narrative of Pharaoh’s hardening is also very interesting. Luther 
holds God as moving evil within Pharaoh and moving upon Him from 
without in circumstances. It does not seem that the text necessitates hold-
ing that God controlled Pharaoh’s will, as the hardening can simply mean 
that God worked through circumstance to push Pharaoh’s hand towards 
decision. Moreover, it should be recognized that the Bible not only says 
God hardened Pharaoh’s heart, but also that Pharaoh hardened his own 
heart (See Ex 8:15,32; 9:34; 1 Sam 6:6) .  
The potter and the clay metaphor is also very important to note. This 
is clearly an allusion by Paul to the OT metaphor, which does not seem 
to have predestinarian overtones. God is clearly affirmed as omnipotent, 
He is the Creator and the shaper, and in comparison to him humans are 
like clay.136 The analogy need not be stretched so far that we are viewed 
as inanimate like clay. Clay is dead, humans are living. The preface to 
                                                
133 Gonzalez, 50. James “always caused him difficulties through its insistence on 
works over against faith” (Gonzalez, 49). Luther writes, “The epistle of James gives us 
much trouble . . . Accordingly, if they will not admit of my interpretations, then I shall 
make rubble also out of it. I almost feel like throwing Jimmy into the stove, as the priest 
in Kalenberg did” (Luther, Career of the Reformer IV, 317). 
134 See the previous section on Luther’s Biblical Support 
135 It is also important to note that the word “hated” for Esau may be correctly un-
derstood as a comparative term, and not as a term meaning disdain for Esau.  
136 Man was made by God, the potter, from clay in Genesis 2. 
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Jeremiah 18 uses the potter and the clay example and proceeds to lay out 
the conditional response of God based on the people’s choice (Jer 18:7-
10).137 Surely, God’s power is emphasized in this imagery, but not to the 
point of complete impotence of the human. The metaphor need not be 
interpreted as determinist to be consistent with its own context in both 
Paul and the OT (See also 2 Tim 2:21). 
Finally, a little might be said about the case of Balaam. First, this is 
an exceptional case in Scripture and is not necessarily a paradigm for 
God’s operation. Nevertheless, Balaam’s will is thwarted by God’s 
power. Balaam desires to curse Israel and ends up blessing Israel. First, it 
should be remembered that Balaam claimed to speak for God. Thus, it 
could be suggested that this circumstance qualified the situation, since 
Balaam did not have the right to claim to speak for God and thereby in-
jure others. Moreover, there was nothing that God overruled which 
would keep Balaam from salvation. In other words, by God intervening 
and overpowering Balaam’s will He injured neither Balaam, nor his op-
portunity for salvation.138 
We have seen the texts Luther uses to support his position, but what 
about those that seem to disagree with his view? One example is Matt 
23:37, where Jesus states, “O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the 
prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I 
have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens 
under her wings, and ye would not!” This text suggests that it is God’s 
will that Jerusalem be spared and that man’s will is to blame. Luther re-
sponds, “why the Majesty does not remove or change this fault of will in 
every man . . . or why He lays this fault to the charge of the will, when 
man cannot avoid it, it is not lawful to ask.”139 But why is it not lawful to 
ask? The text asserts that the situation is not Jesus’ will. Luther tries to 
                                                
137 For further analysis of this passage, see John C. Peckham, “The Passible Potter 
and the Contingent Clay: An Exegetical and Theological Analysis of Jeremiah 18:1-10,” 
Journal of the Adventist Theological Society, 18/1 (2007): 130–150. 
138 The question may be asked why God doesn’t overrule all wills for salvation. If 
God were to overrule all wills, than free will would be obsolete, as Luther claims. This 
would mean that no one can freely enter into a love relationship with God. The Creator 
does not desire automatons, or robots, but beings that can love and be loved. I have sug-
gested that God may have overruled Balaam’s speech in this case, and without contradict-
ing His policy of free will, based at least partly on Balaam’s presumption to speak for 
God and the nature of the case. This does not mean that God arbitrarily overrules wills 
whenever He pleases; the weight of Scripture is to the contrary of this notion.  
139 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 171. 
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reconcile this text with his own view, saying, “He [God] has granted him 
[man] a free use of things at his own will, and not hedged him in with 
any laws of commands.”140 Nevertheless, to be consistent with Luther’s 
other statements, God still must have decreed the human will, and so this 
falls short as a solution. This and other passages seem to require some 
freedom of the human will to make any sense. 
There are many other places where prophets, or God, or Jesus plead 
with people to repent and to come to Him. There are also many condi-
tional statements that those who believe will be saved (i.e. John 3:16). 
There is also another prominent example of texts that suggest free will in 
the Bible. Notice Luther’s treatment of Matt 19:17, which says, “if thou 
wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.” Luther does not accept the 
text as it reads, but revises it to be in accordance with a will in bondage. 
His revision states “if ever thou shalt have the will to keep the com-
mandments (which you will have, not of yourself, but of God, who gives 
it to whom He will), then they also shall preserve thee.” This is not what 
the text says, but is indicative of Luther’s interpretation of conditional 
statements. 
McSorley states, “In the course of his argument against Erasmus, Lu-
ther lays down a principle which forces him to stand alone in the history 
of Christian biblical interpretation.”141 He dismisses all of these texts 
based on a single grammatical argument. He states derisively that “a 
conditional statement asserts nothing indicatively.”142 In other words, 
God’s call for man to do something doesn’t mean that man can do it, it 
does not imply ability to act. McSorley reacts that this is “clearly exag-
gerated and one-sided because it ignores the rules of personal dia-
logue.”143 In other words, this rule cannot really sweep away all the 
pleadings of God with man throughout the Bible. Why would God make 
so many calls for repentance in the Bible? Luther claims it is “so as to 
bring him [man] by experience of himself to a knowledge of his disease 
                                                
140 Ibid., 150. 
141 McSorley, 350. 
142 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 151. In another place Luther explains, “For they 
show us what we ought to do, but do not give us the power to do it. They were ordained, 
however, for the purpose of showing man to himself; that through them he may learn his 
own impotence for good, and may despair of his own strength” (Luther, Christian Lib-
erty, 12).  
143 McSorley, 351. 
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or weakness, to which he cannot lead him by any other course.”144 So it 
seems the call is to provoke the sinner, but what good can provocation 
even do for one who has no power of the will? In response to the com-
mon assertion that this would mean God is mocking us, Luther replies, 
“Why should not this conclusion follow rather: therefore, God is trying 
us, that by His law He may bring us to a knowledge of our impotence.”145 
Thus these exhortations tell us, “not what we can do, but what we ought 
to do.”146 However, this is against a multitude of evidence to the con-
trary. The clear reading of the texts are that God genuinely desires all to 
be saved (2 Pet 3:9; Tit 2:11; 1 Tim 2:4) and that they can come to Him 
if they will choose to do so.  
It is interesting to note, however, that Luther, in his final translation 
in the German Bible (1546) of 1 Tim 2:4 actually changed the word 
sw¿zw, literally “saved,” to “helped.”147 On this translation Lowell Green 
comments, “Therefore, (a) God wills all people to receive help for their 
temporal needs; (b) God wills all people to know that he alone is the 
source of all temporal good.”148 Luther states, “Accordingly, when we 
make a distinction of salvation between faithful and faithless people, we 
must draw from those passages this conclusion, that Paul here refers to 
general salvation.”149 For Luther, this verse does not speak of salvation 
meaning eternal life, but refers to temporal helps and general knowledge. 
Luther is right in asserting that these calls do not mean “that these 
things can be done by our own strength!”150 Yet, what if God makes it 
possible for man to repent in God’s own strength? Luther says of these 
invitations to turn, “it does not follow from this that man is converted by 
                                                
144 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 151. Luther comments, “reason thinks that man 
is mocked by an impossible command.” Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 158. 
145 Ibid., 153. He goes on to say, “although the first man was not impotent, inasmuch 
as grace assisted him, yet God by this commandment shows him clearly enough how 
impotent he would be without grace” (ibid., 156. However, he will not allow a prevenient 
assisting grace to resolve this dilemma.  
146 Ibid., 157. 
147 Lowell C. Green, “Luther’s Understanding of the Freedom of God and the Salva-
tion of Man: His Interpretation of 1 Timothy 2:4,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte, 87 
(1996): 58. 
148 Ibid.: 59. See Luther’s full commentary on 1 Tim 2:4 in Martin Luther, Lectures 
on 1 Timothy, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald, and Helmut T. Lehmann, Luther’s 
Works (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1999), 28:260-261. 
149 Ibid., 261. 
150 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 159. 
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his own power.”151 This is unchallenged, even by Erasmus, but Luther 
still considers free will to necessarily mean omnipotent and unassisted 
will, which confuses the issue. Affirming this limited free will to respond 
to the biblical call to repentance does not mean that humans can save 
themselves, but that God has offered grace and has made provision so 
that they can choose to accept that grace.152 The gift is no less free be-
cause it has been willingly accepted. Thus, it seems that the matter of the 
definition of freedom, specifically the extent of free will, greatly contrib-
utes to the conflict. 
 
Conclusion 
Martin Luther stands as a pillar of faith and reform, and Christianity 
owes a great debt of gratitude to his faith and courage in standing up 
against persecution for a biblical faith in Jesus Christ. This paper has fo-
cused on but one part of Luther’s theology, and narrowly at one aspect of 
Luther’s view of justification by faith. This should not be taken as a re-
buke of Luther, his reforms, or his whole theology, but as a wrestling 
with the need for further reform and theological diligence. It is apparent 
that Luther was sincere and faithful in his desire to protect God’s sover-
eignty and grace from injury. That God sent His Son to save us is at the 
heart of Luther’s argument, as it should be in all biblical theology.  
Many understandable factors contributed to Luther’s predestinarian 
view, including his experience with a works-based faith, the polemic 
context with Erasmus, and his belief that free will was against the gospel 
in the writings of Paul.153 Luther’s doctrine of the will might have been 
quite different if it had developed outside of the polemic concept against 
Erasmus and works righteousness in the reform movement. Luther was 
also very influenced by Augustine’s writings on predestination, them-
selves products of the polemic with Pelagius and a neoplatonic ontology. 
                                                
151 Ibid., 164. 
152 There are biblical statements that literally assert that works are rewarded, and 
people are judged “according to their works”(See 2 Chron 15:7; Job 34:11; 2 Tim 2:21). 
These should not be dismissed simply because they challenge a certain conception of 
grace. Neither do these statements injure grace, but might be understood in a balanced 
model of salvation that deals with God’s graceful and primary work and the human’s 
cooperation in that work. 
153 Without rejecting predestination, due to its lack of clarity and abundance of con-
troversy, Gerrish proposes that “This witness to grace, not the predestinarian theology of 
grace, is where the preachers of the Reformed church must take their stand” (Gerrish, 
57). 
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Luther sincerely desired to protect grace from anything that might un-
dermine it. This may have clouded his ability to see the meaning in pas-
sages such as 1 Tim 2:4. Theologians of today can learn a great lesson 
from this. There is always a danger in pure polemics. Often positions are 
defended and stretched beyond their biblical basis in the heat of debate. 
We should remember to take a step back and examine our own presuppo-
sitions and honestly engage the thoughts of those who differ from our 
interpretation. Luther was often not granted the freedom of this option. 
He was constantly facing persecution, even death, and to give any 
ground would have seemed to him like compromise. Thus, I believe we 
can understand where Luther was coming from, even if we may not 
agree with his conclusions on the human will. 
Luther’s view on the will is not always a coherent picture regarding 
the God of the Bible. As McSorley states, Luther’s refusal to allow any 
“misuse of free will” in the fall makes him “affirm the justice of God 
while at the same time affirming that God condemns those who are un-
free and who therefore are not deserving of condemnation.”154 This is a 
blight on the character of God and a danger to people who might give up 
any thought of turning to God in despair at such a doctrine. 
Of course, Luther is absolutely correct that no one deserves grace, 
but what separates those who receive condemnation? Does God really 
only give grace to some? Is Jesus Christ’s death only applicable to some, 
or did he die for all? These questions have raged throughout the centuries 
of Christian history and continue to be topics of debate. Luther’s pro-
posed solution, the hiddenness of God, implies a duality in God which is 
beyond understanding. But if the hidden God is unknown, why does Lu-
ther have so much to attribute to the hiddenness of God? It would be 
more congruent with Luther’s methodology if he would stick to what is 
said about the revealed God.155 In revelation, God is said to be the Savior 
and He is spoken of as a God of judgment. Thus, both poles are spoken 
                                                
154 McSorley, 344. 
155 Robert Shofner, on the other hand, holds that though it often seems that “Luther 
frequently says a great deal more than this, ‘God hidden, God revealed’ principle will 
support . . .” in reality he does not. He contends that Luther speaks of the hidden God to 
the extent that Scripture does. However, if Scripture speaks of these activities, are they 
not then revealed? Doesn’t Luther still overstep the bounds when he proposes that the 
reason some are saved and some are lost must reside in the hidden God? This paper con-
tends that he does. 
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in the revelation about God, thus about the revealed God.156 The Bible 
claims of this same God that He “is not willing that any should perish” (2 
Pet 3:9). How is this reconcilable with the idea of a God that wills only 
some to be saved?157 It is not, unless God is viewed as different in His 
hiddenness than in His revelation.158 But what would this then say about 
His revelation? 
Further, it seems that Luther’s conclusion that only some receive 
grace is utterly connected to his conception of God’s sovereign grace. If 
grace is irresistible, then only those who receive grace are consequently 
saved. But if, contrary to this, grace is not irresistible, God could theo-
retically offer grace to all, even though all might not accept it. The Bible 
claims also that God desires all men to be saved (2 Pet 3:9, Titus 2, 1 
Tim 2) and draws all to Himself (John 12:32). If it is God’s will that all 
be saved, surely every person has the opportunity for salvation. Luther 
once acknowledged this, saying, “God wants all to be saved and partici-
pate in his eternal bliss (1 Tim 2:4). God does not want sinners to die but 
to be turned to him and live (Ezek. 18:32). Thus, Luther’s correspondent 
should know, God’s grace is without limit toward those who trust in 
him.”159 In saying this, however, Luther did not give up his predesti-
narian view.160 Luther felt a burden to uphold the depravity of the will 
and feared any conception of freedom, meaning neutrality of the will. 161 
Luther was right to react against a works-based salvation and a belief that 
man could save himself without God’s grace. However, is it not possible 
that the neutrality of the will can be denied, the fall and effects of sin on 
                                                
156 Jesus Himself, the ultimate revelation of God for Luther, is spoken of as a judge, 
a characteristic which would fall under the category of hidden for Luther. 
157 The tragedy of a logical conclusion, that only some are willed to be saved is 
countered by the idea of universalism. This idea still posits that God decrees those who 
are saved, but the conflict is seemingly avoided because God saves everyone. This would 
not work in Luther’s system because of the demands of justice. The demands of justice in 
the Bible also preclude such a position on salvation.  
158 There is a place for speaking of God hidden, in the sense that we do not and can-
not know everything about God, for He is beyond understanding. The problem arises 
when it is implied that the hidden God is actually different and other than the revealed 
God. This would make the revelation of God inconsistent with God’s true character that 
we don’t know. Thus, there is a lot about God that we don’t understand, but it need not be 
seen as inconsistent with what the Bible does proclaim about Him.  
159 Luther, Career of the Reformer III, 140. 
160 Pannenberg claimed Luther changed his position to a freedom of the will later in 
life, but there is no objective evidence that supports this claim (McSorley, 356-357). 
161 Forde, 55. 
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man can be affirmed, and God can grant each sinner opportunity and 
ability to respond to the gospel? 
A potential solution to this paradox might be an amendment of the 
view of the reception of grace with a possibility to refuse God’s grace. 
Without such a nuance, one is left with utter determinism. Furthermore, 
if there is no choice, even unmeritorious, included in salvation, then it 
seems difficult to see God as the righteous judge. If God predestines the 
will, apart from any human contribution, then the fall of man was God’s 
responsibility. If He does not, then the option is given to choose to serve 
or not to serve Him. The latter seems to be in accord with God’s call for 
repentance throughout the Bible.  
Allowing the human will a choice in salvation would still preserve a 
serious view of the sinfulness and depravity that has attached itself to 
human nature after the fall. In this model, man’s freedom does not con-
sist of power to overcome sin solely by his own will, but only through 
the power of God offered freely as a gift. The acceptance of the gift is 
not meritorious, and salvation is not earned. Moreover, God’s omnipo-
tence is not damaged, for it is His power that He extends to creation, 
granting them the actual power to effect history. His power is no less 
because He chooses not to overrule all wills but His own. Rather, His 
power is extended as it manifests itself in love. Through Jesus Christ, 
God’s power is “made perfect in weakness” (2 Cor 12:9). Far from 
meaning that man can save himself, God shows that man can only be 
saved through Jesus Christ, and He beckons the weary to come to Him 
(Matt 11:28-30). The actuality and power of this very choice is explicit 
in a most famous text of the Bible, “For God so loved the world that He 
gave His only begotten son, that whoever believes in Him should not 
perish but have everlasting life (John 3:16).” 
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